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Abstract 
Currently, microeconomic theory is only of very limited use to understand price levels in the 
service sector. After a brief review of the literature on service pricing, this paper claims that price 
levels in the service sector are not only dependent on qualification levels, but also on the 
difference between the levels of non-monetary utility which customers on the one hand and 
providers on the other experience. An activity choice model shows why the ratio between utility 
differentials and prices should converge within a service segment. Theoretically, the approach 
finds a pragmatic alternative to the alleged impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons in 
economic mainstream theory. Practically, it is able to explain the high price level for sex services 
compared with other service segments. 
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1. Introduction 
Today’s microeconomic framework has largely been created in the phase of society’s 
industrialization. For developed economies with a share of the service sector between 70 (EU) and 80 
(US) per cent of GDP, it leaves a number of questions unanswered. This claim concerns pricing, for 
example. “In neoclassical theory, prices are determined by marginal productivities of inputs.” (Elsner 
et al., 2015; 146). This statement is useful for industrial products where employed labor and 
commodities like oil and iron are used to manufacture goods. It is much less useful for self-employed 
violin teachers or translators. The productivity of their input can only be estimated by observing 
customer’s willingness-to-pay, so that the statement becomes tautological. 
This paper suggests an alternative theoretical approach for pricing labor by applying the ‘activity 
choice’ framework which lately has been used for explaining workaholism (Mann, 2013) and the 
effect of minimum wages (Mann, 2015). While the service sector in general is apt to such an 
approach, we use 1:1 personal services as a case in point, i.e. services in which one service provider 
and one service recipient spend equally much time with each other, as often the case in above 
examples of violin teachers or translators. However, this approach in incompatible with neoclassical 
theory insofar as it involves interpersonal utility comparisons, a taboo at least since Pareto (1891). 
Before doing so, it appears useful to summarize the state of knowledge about service pricing, which 
will be done in the following Section. Section 3 will then contain a brief introduction of the activity 
choice framework and its application to 1:1 services. Section 4  is looking for supportive arguments 
for the approach and Section 5 draws conclusions with respect to interpersonal utility comparisons 
before general conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature on Service Pricing 
In general, thoughts on appropriate pricing come from microeconomic thinkers and marketing 
experts, two relatively separated schools of thinking which are interlinked only in few exceptions (eg. 
Penning, 1998). The microeconomic approaches are usually not sector-dependent, although their 
application, as denoted above, is usually more helpful in sectors which use both capital and 
employed labor. Marketing scholars, on the other hand, are often very concrete in their field of 
application as “marketing theory grew out of – and away from – the old perfect competition 
assumption” (Blenker, 2001). They consider pricing as a strategic task in which competition and 
demand structure have to be taken into account closely (Desiraju and Shugan, 1999; Essegaier et al., 
2002). 
A subject that repeatedly appears when talking about service pricing is the strong link to service 
quality. Services are price sensitive and one of the most frequent reasons to change the supplier 
(Keaveney, 1995). However, in spite of a “lack of objective measures for evaluating service quality” 
(Gwinner et al., 1998; 101), a high quality of services, customers’ need of fulfillment and satisfaction, 
is repeatedly mentioned as being more important than keeping prices low (eg. Groth, 1995). This 
applies particularly in high-end businesses like the market for consulting services (Richter and 
Niewim, 2004). 
Among the many segments of the service sector, prostitution is probably the field with most 
empirical and theoretical studies. One reason for this may be that many other service markets 
(health, education etc.) are often governed through price and access regulations whereas the 
prostitution market is shaped by market forces to a rather strong degree. Another reason for the 
high degree of attention may be the fact that very high returns can be earned in this market even on 
the base of low educational standards, a phenomenon that Edlund and Korn (2002) explain by the 
high opportunity costs (in terms of foregone marriage chances) of the profession. A number of 
empirical contributions (Moffatt and Peters, 2004; Cunningham and Kendall, 2011; Adriaenssens and 
Hendrickx ,2012), however, also show the dependency of prostitution prices from the service level 
provided. Sex without penetration, for example, generates considerable discounts, whereas 
penetration without condoms leads to additional revenues. This confirms the strong relation 
between pricing and perceived quality of the service. 
 
3. An application of the Activity Choice Model 
Few people would deny that the process of working can generate individual utility. For a long time, 
however, this utility could not be reflected in the framework of welfare economics, leading to the 
following critical statement by Pagano (1985; 173): 
“Conservative priests used to prescribe the status quo by saying that life itself was a means to a 
superior end existing somewhere in the sky; economists would assume a similar role by maintaining 
that working life is simply a means to a superior end, existing somewhere on earth, called 
consumption goods and leisure. But our working life affects our welfare as much as our non-working 
life and the availability of consumption goods.” 
The Activity Choice Model is an attempt to integrate the utility as derived through working into the 
microeconomic calculus. It does so through a two-dimensional perspective in which each activity has 
a non-monetary utility and a financial consequence (positive in the case of paid activities (Y>0), zero 
in the non-market sphere (Y=0) and negative in the case of consumption (Y<0)). Usually, one can 
choose between a limited set of options in the three spheres. Which activity maximizes utility and is 
ultimately chosen can be answered with the help of indifference curves. For details we refer to Mann 
(2013). 
Figure 1 makes a suggestion what this may have to do with the market for services. For each service 
there is one provider and a customer. Take a massage as a case in point. Usually, the masseur is 
taking the role of the provider and receives money, whereas the one massaged takes the role of the 
customer and pays. That this is the case – or so the model suggests - is simply due to differences in 
non-monetary utility. If the masseur would enjoy carrying out the massage as much as the customer 
enjoys being massaged, then neither of them would get the idea to charge the other. 
An anecdotal illustration from another (not 1:1) segment of the service market may help: In the small 
Swiss town in which I live, there are two English conversation groups. One is run by a group of mostly 
American expatriates coming together on a regular base to have a chat in their native language. The 
other group is run by an American lady, but all other participants are Swiss (or non-English 
foreigners) who want to improve their English. Readers will have guessed by now that the first group 
is not based on monetary exchanges, while the American lady charges the other group members. 
Possible counterexamples may pop up in the reader’s mind, such as a visit at the dentist who will, in 
many instances, have a higher level of utility during his work than the customer enduring pain and 
inconvenience.  For this case, it is almost sufficient to refer back to Kahneman et al.’s (1997) 
important distinction between ‘decision utility’ and ‘experienced utility’. Taking the long-term 
consequences of not seeing the dentist into account, attending the surgery generates a lot more 
decision utility than the alternative – and apparently also more than the dentist experiences while 
fixing the teeth. 
At this stage, the economic axiom of the impossibility of comparing utility interpersonally should be 
taken into account. It has been shown before that many bricks of economic research can only prevail 
by implicitly allowing for interpersonal utility comparisons (Mann, 2007). The example of the two 
conversation groups shows as well that utility comparisons are carried out on a regular base in 
practice, albeit only in a proximate way. It is unlikely that the utility derived by members from the 
first group (the native speakers) is exactly the same for everybody. However, differences are not 
clear and large enough to move these activities out of the unpaid sphere. In the case of the second 
group, it is obvious that correcting false phrases and listen to bad pronunciations is less enjoyable for 
a native speaker than it is for a Swiss to steadily improve her English. This justifies a certain fee to be 
paid from the Swiss to the American. And only if some Swiss and the American agree on this fact, the 
group will be working. These proximate estimations are part of everyday life and made explicit by the 
framework suggested, even if contradicting theoretical mainstream concepts. 
Coming back to Figure 1, we abstract from taxes that a service may incur and assume that the price 
paid by the customer C equals the price received by the provider P (p1). The slope of the line between 
P and C shows the implicit price for the utility difference. 
Consider now the possibility that the service is extended. What has been a massage now starts to 
include sexual service or the only American of the  conversation group starts to distribute and correct 
homework. According to the empirical evidence cited above, such an extension of the original service 
usually leads to an increased price. In Figure 2, this situation is described by p2, caused and justified 
by an increased difference in non-monetary utility levels. 
 
Figure 1: A framework for understanding prices in the 1:1 personal service market 
The paradigm of utility differences leading to paid services has its limits. One is the possibility of 
rents. It could well be that the masseur enjoys his job extremely and would do it for free, but does 
not mind that his customers pay him the usual price for a massage. Likewise, there may be customers 
who enjoy being massaged to a degree that they would pay much more if necessary. However, it is 
well known that willingnesses-to-pay often exceed prices and some willingnesses-to-accept are much 
lower than market prices, leading to positive rents of participants. Therefore, we should think of 
minimum utility levels which are depicted in the diagram below. 
It is also clear that not only utility differences, but also qualification forms the price of a service. The 
difference of utilities may be larger when I undergo a cosmetic treatment than when I receive 
psychological counselling. However, trained psychologists are scarcer and becoming a psychologist 
requires more ex-ante investment than for talented beauticians. These differences dominate 
differences in u and lead to higher hourly reimbursements. 
The last limit concerns the non-market sphere. A mother changing her baby’s napkin is probably 
often enjoying this process less than her baby. The fact that the baby will not pay for the napkins 
being changed just refers to the fact that valuable services (and products) are interchanged without 
financial reimbursements in certain spheres of society, a fact that has been well described, for 
example, by Williams (2004); Himmelweit (2007) and Faria and Abdalla (2014). The activity choice 
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model is helpful to understand prices in the service market, not voluntary exchanges outside the 
market. 
 
4. The issue of constant trade-offs 
By Figure 1, it has been proposed that the rate with which utility differences translate into payment 
levels is constant. This claim is now supported by taking a look at a disequilibrium as drawn in Figure 
2. 
Consider two providers P and two customers C, using again the market for massages as an 
illustration. The first couple (P1 and C1)  has only a small difference in utility levels, although the 
customer pays a relative high price p1 to the provider. The utility difference between P2 and C2 is 
much larger, but they have agreed that the lower price p2 will be paid. In this example, we have 
integrated the indifference curves I1 and I2 into the diagram which, for reasons of graphical simplicity, 
have been assumed as identical for all four participants and where u(I2)>u(I1). 
 
 
Figure 2: Disequilibrium in a 1:1 service market 
The arrows in Figure 2 indicate what will happen under the usually assumed conditions of product 
homogeneity, complete information and rational behavior. Customer 1 realizes that Provider 2 
charges lower prices but that his massages are more enjoyable than the ones of P1.  At the same 
time, Provider 2 realizes that Customer 1 pays better than his current C2 in spite of getting a worse 
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service. This means that C1 and P2 would both benefit from taking up relations, both with the 
perspective to shift their indifference curve upwards, which they will likely do. 
The model is neither able to predict what price would P2 then finally charge C1 (except that it would 
be between p1 and p2), nor what would happen with P1 and C2, but it is able to show that, in a 
homogeneous market, different rates of substitution between non-monetary utility and money are 
not sustainable. 
 
5. Utility comparison vs. production functions 
Today’s economic thinking has been developed during the phase of industrialization. The markets 
which economists have been describing over the last 200 years have been markets on which oil 
barrels, fridges or books have been traded – complex products made of different capital items and of 
labor with different levels of qualification. It was convenient to construct production functions to 
explain costs and, subsequently, prices. The prices for labor, by the way, were rarely equilibrium 
prices but rather the result of negotiations between unions and employers. 
This, in general, is still applicable for the industrial world today, except for the fact that a lot of labor 
has gradually been replaced by capital. This process of substitution has led to a massive flow of labor 
from the secondary to the tertiary sector, where now the vast majority of labor takes place. Again, a 
part of this happens in larger units like banks or insurances, where still something like production 
functions for the outputs (like credits or insurance contracts) may be a useful abstraction to 
understand the economics behind it. 
However, as documented by a lot of social scientists (Diewald, 2004; Westermayer, 2006) and 
occasionally termed as “post-industrial labor” (Troy, 1990; Carré, 2000), increasingly smaller 
entrepreneurial units carry out highly individualized tasks. It is reported from this labor-market 
segment that the boundaries between labor and leisure become blurred: Video-game programming, 
for example, moves from leisure networks towards professionalism (Postigo, 2003), whereas in many 
branches longer hours are defended by lifestyle choices (Lewis, 2003).  
How does pricing work in these micro-units where economics often breaks down to personal 
interactions in which one person takes the role of the provider and the other as the customer? If two 
persons spend an hour together, and after this hour one gives money to the other, there are barely 
two possible explanations: 
 One, a set of traditional rules creates the obligation for one person to pay the other 
 Two, the recipient would not have spent this hour in this way without the payment, whereas 
the other person has a sufficient willingness-to-pay. 
If we agree with Habermas’ (1981) theory of the rationalization of society, the first option, while it 
may play a role under certain circumstances, will have decreasing explanatory power. This leaves a 
lot of plausibility for the second answer. It indicates, however,  that (at least tacit and implicit) 
assumptions about the difference of utility levels are necessary in order to define price levels and 
even the role distribution between provider and customer. 
“Every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and no common denominator of feelings is possible” 
(Robbins, 1938; 636). Such and similar arguments have convinced the vast majority of economists to 
practice a “hands off” policy towards interpersonal utility comparisons. However, this inscrutability 
does not defer millions of people every day to compare utility levels and to then make decisions on 
offering money for services and services for money. Our estimations of interpersonally comparing 
utility levels are apparently good enough to create a growing and well-functioning market of 1:1 
personal services. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Economists working in the realm of social choice have invested a lot of energy to develop utility 
orderings on the interpersonal level which allow for utility comparisons (Gevers, 1979; Roberts, 
1980) with a high level of technicality, but with low benefits in terms of the operationalization of 
such comparisons. However, it may be only the possibility of approximate interpersonal utility 
comparisons leading to the fact that an hour spent with a prostitute is much more expensive than an 
hour spent with a language trainer, even though becoming a language trainer probably requires a 
higher degree of qualification. It is plausible to assume that prostitute is a profession with a lower-
than-average non-monetary utility while being a john may generate particularly high utility levels. 
Empirical research can clearly contribute to quantify the explanatory power to explain price 
differentials in difference service markets through different levels of utility differences between 
recipients and customers. 
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